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NSC BRIEFING

5 October 1954

SOVIET SUPPORT FOR CHINESE COMMUNISTS

- I. Public Soviet support for Peiping reached new high at celebrations Chinese Communist fifth anniversary.
 - A. USSR delegation ^{to Peiping} included three of nine Presidium members, led by #2 Soviet, Khrushchev (also present--Bulganin, Mikoyan). Highest ranking group outside USSR since '47.
 - B. Chinese ceremonies in Moscow drew other six Presidium members.
- II. Top Soviet speech was by Khrushchev at Peiping: reaffirmed Sino-Soviet friendship, plugged alliance, cited 1950 treaty as clear-cut demonstration solidarity.
 - A. Heavy play to "peaceful co-existence" theme, but warned "if imperialists dare unleash war against us, imperialism doomed to fatal destruction."

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- B. Endorsed Chou's call for Asian collective security.
- C. Pinpointed Formosa, stating US frustrating island's "liberation", developing "military base for invading Chinese mainland..." Said "Soviet people" sympathize, "support Chinese people in determination to liberate suffering brothers." Concluded "Formosa can certainly be liberated."

III. This is first top-level pledge of Soviet "people's" "support" for this Chinese Communist goal.

- A. Over past two months, USSR has treated Formosa cautiously: little independent comment--instead quoted Peiping.

IV. Chinese speakers also plugged friendship theme: Chou cited formal treaty bond, Peiping's enthusiasm as ally of USSR.

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- A. Like Khrushchev, Chou observed US still "attempting obstruct Chinese people from liberating Formosa" similarly concluded that Peiping "will certainly liberate Formosa."
- B. Gen. Peng Teh-huai (former Korea commander, ~~in Korea~~⁹ now Minister of Defense) stated "struggle to liberate Formosa... is still unfinished task of Chinese people's war of liberation... ."
- C. Told army "redouble efforts, so that we shall assuredly free Formosa from yoke of American imperialists."
- V. Neither Soviet nor Chinese pronouncements are as immediately ominous as they appear.
 - A. Khrushchev's speech ignored both "when" of operation, and "what" of Soviet support. Also Sino-Soviet treaty not linked to Formosa question.

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- B. As sidelight, Moscow AP man, reporting speech, had "unusual" interview with censor, who pointed out that Khrushchev said Soviet "people"--not government--supported Formosa stand.
 - C. Chou, following practice since 1950, also avoided "when" of Formosa "liberation."
 - D. Moreover, Gen. Peng's "order of day" did not put army on alert to invade Formosa; instead ordered to be "constantly prepared for combat," and specified Formosa as one objective.
- VI. Since start of Formosa propaganda campaign began (July 54), Peiping's top-level spokesmen have carefully hedged "when" question.

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- A. Usually state further preparations necessary before operation can be undertaken.
- B. Further negative consideration—Moscow's recent policies toward Far East appear geared to higher priority aims in Europe; "liberation" of Formosa at this time would be inimical to those aims.
- C. None of these negative considerations necessarily applies, however, to the offshore islands.

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